SHARING THE WEALTH: SOCIAL COMPARISONS AND PAY DISPERSION IN THE CEO'S TOP TEAM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fredrickson, James W.; Davis-Blake, Alison; Sanders, W. M. Gerard
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Rice University
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.848
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1031-1053
• 关键词: social comparisons; Executive compensation; PAY DISPERSION; TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS

摘要

The antecedents and consequences of pay dispersion are studied using theory that focuses on the social comparisons that occur among members of the CEO's top team. Results from a sample of large public firms indicate that when members of this elite group were similar on a variety of dimensions, and thus likely to compare their pay, the board allowed less dispersion. In addition, pay dispersion was negatively related to company performance, particularly when it exceeded what could be justified by characteristics of the industry, firm, or team. But the strength of that relationship depended on how uniformly members of the team would benefit from subsequent performance gains. Specifically, the negative effect was particularly strong in firms where major differences in compensation-that is, some executives were given significantly more stock options-combined with a volatile stock price to provide only a few team members with the opportunity to realize very large financial gains in the future. The study demonstrates that the social-psychological factors that affect comparisons among members of the CEO's top team impact the board's pay setting process, which in turn affects pay dispersion, and ultimately firm performance. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.