WHAT'S ALL THAT (STRATEGIC) NOISE? ANTICIPATORY IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT IN CEO SUCCESSION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Graffin, Scott D.; Carpenter, Mason A.; Boivie, Steven
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.906
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 748-770
• 关键词: CEO succession; Impression management; CEOS; TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS; event study methodology

摘要

We develop and test a novel theory about strategic noise with regard to CEO appointments. Strategic noise is an anticipatory and preemptive form of impression management. At the time it announces a new CEO, a board of directors seeks to manage stakeholder impressions by simultaneously releasing confounding information about other significant events. Several CEO and firm characteristics affect the likelihood that this will happen. Strategic noise is most likely when long-term CEOs have a wide pay gap between other top managers at high stock price performance firms, and when a new CEO does not have previous CEO experience or comes from a less well-regarded firm. Results showing that CEO succession announcements are noisier than they would be by chance have some interesting implications for impression management theory, traditional event study methodology, and managerial and public policy. Interviews with public firm directors on CEO succession provide additional validity for the strategic noise construct and help us to articulate key elements of the theory. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.