EXAMINING THE PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF POST SPIN-OFF LINKS TO PARENT FIRMS: SHOULD THE APRON STRINGS BE CUT?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Semadeni, Matthew; Cannella, Albert A., Jr.
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; Tulane University
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.928
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1083-1098
• 关键词: spin-offs; corporate strategy; governance; Agency theory; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS

摘要

Little research has examined the performance implications of the parent-child relationship post spin-off. Although the parent provided oversight of the child prior to the spin-off, effects of post spin-off links to the child remain unclear. Applying transaction cost and agency theories, our study of 142 firms spun-off between 1986 and 1997 examines how oversight and ownership by the parent firm influence stock market performance post spin-off. We find that while child firms benefit from some links to the parent, having too many links is negatively related to performance. The findings suggest that there is a balance between having too much parental involvement and not enough. Our study extends understanding of post spin-off child firm performance and provides valuable insights for both parent and child firms. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.