PLATFORM ENVELOPMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eisenmann, Thomas; Parker, Geoffrey; Van Alstyne, Marshall
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Tulane University; Boston University
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.935
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1270-1285
• 关键词: entry; platforms; network effects; bundling; Two-sided markets

摘要

Due to network effects and switching costs in platform markets, entrants generally must offer revolutionary functionality to win substantial market share. We explore a second entry path that does not rely upon Schumpeterian innovation: platform envelopment. Through envelopment, a provider in one platform market can enter another platform market, and combine its own functionality with that of the target in a multi-platform bundle that leverages shared user relationships. Envelopers capture market share by foreclosing an incumbent's access to users; in doing so, they harness the network effects that previously had protected the incumbent. We present a typology of envelopment attacks based on whether platform pairs are complements, weak substitutes, or functionally unrelated and we analyze conditions under which these attack types are likely to succeed. Copyright. (C) 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.