Using private management standard certification to reduce information asymmetries in corrupt environments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Montiel, Ivan; Husted, Bryan W.; Christmann, Petra
• 署名单位: Loyola Marymount University; York University - Canada; Tecnologico de Monterrey; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Newark; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.1957
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1103-1113
• 关键词: corruption; information asymmetry; private certification; environmental management systems; Mexico

摘要

This paper investigates how corruption in the institutional environment influences firms' decisions to obtain third-party certification to private management standards as signals of desirable conduct. We argue that policy-specific corruption erodes trust in government efforts to regulate firms' conduct, thus increasing the signaling value of private certifications and the likelihood of certification. However, widespread corruption in the general environment can extend distrust to private certification systems, which reduces the credibility and signaling value of private certifications, thus decreasing the likelihood that firms obtain certification. Our empirical results based on ISO 14001 environmental management system certification among 433 automotive plants in Mexico confirm these relationships. We discuss the implications of our findings for transaction cost economics, institutional theory, research, and practice. Copyright (c) 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.