Do Reputational Sanctions Deter Negligence in Information Security Management? A Field Quasi-Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tang, Qian; Whinston, Andrew B.
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/poms.13119
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 410-427
• 关键词: field quasi-experiment; Information Security; reputational sanction; spam

摘要

Security negligence, a major cause of data breaches, occurs when an organization's information technology management fails to adequately address security vulnerabilities. By conducting a field quasi-experiment using outgoing spam as a focal security issue, this study investigates the effectiveness of reputational sanctions in reducing security negligence in a global context. In the quasi-experiment, a reputational sanction mechanism based on outgoing spam was established for four countries, and for each country, reputational sanctions were imposed on the 10 organizations with the largest outgoing spam volumes-that is, these organizations were listed publicly. We find that because of our reputational sanction mechanism, organizations in the four countries, including those that were not listed, reduced outgoing spam significantly compared to those in similar countries. Within each country, the listed organizations, whose reputations were actually sanctioned, reduced spam to a greater extent than those that were not listed. The spam reduction in the not-listed organizations is mainly driven by increased security awareness, while the reduction in the listed organizations is primarily due to reputation effect. Among the listed organizations, those ranked lower were more responsive to the reputational sanctions. Moreover, we find that reputational sanctions have a stronger effect on large organizations and important organizations that provide network access and transit to others.