COMPETITION, GOVERNANCE, AND RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS: THEORY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jia, Nan
• 署名单位: University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.2077
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1551-1567
• 关键词: asset specificity; relationship-specific investment; COMPETITION; governance; biform game

摘要

This paper uses biform games to examine the endogenous decision to invest in relationship-specific assets. It addresses the questions of how competition affects suppliers' decisions to produce a general-purpose product or a relationship-specific product for a buyer and under what circumstances a governance arrangement designed to share investment costs between the transacting parties increases the investment in relationship-specific assets. We offer a balanced perspective that emphasizes both the superior transaction value of relationship-specific products and their high transaction costs while considering the competition effects generated by alternative investment plans. The model and its extensions generate new insights into investment decisions regarding relationship-specific assets. Copyright (C) 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.