CEO compensation: A resource advantage and stakeholder-bargaining perspective

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pandher, Gurupdesh; Currie, Russell
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.1995
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 22-41
• 关键词: ceo pay; resource perspective; Stakeholders; corporate strategy; Offshoring

摘要

This paper studies how CEO pay and its composition is shaped by strategic factors related to the firm's capacity to generate rents and value, the uncertainty of its resource advantage, and the competitive interaction between firm stakeholders and top management. This is done using an analytical framework in which the CEO and other firm stakeholders interact over the firm's resource surplus as utility-maximizing claimants based on their relative bargaining power while providing shareholders their market-based required return. Results from the model yield a number of cogent strategic insights and predictions on the causal interplay between CEO pay, firm growth and risk characteristics, stakeholder management, corporate strategy (e.g., offshoring production), and behavioral biases such as CEO optimism and overconfidence. Copyright (c) 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.