EXTERNAL COO/PRESIDENTS AS EXPERT DIRECTORS: A NEW LOOK AT THE SERVICE ROLE OF BOARDS
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Krause, Ryan; Semadeni, Matthew; Cannella, Albert A., Jr.
署名单位:
Texas Christian University; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
刊物名称:
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN:
0143-2095
DOI:
10.1002/smj.2081
发表日期:
2013
页码:
1628-1641
关键词:
Boards of directors
COO
presidents
expertise
Operational efficiency
TOP MANAGEMENT
摘要:
Much of the scholarship on boards of directors has examined either the control (i.e., monitoring) role or the resource dependence role that boards fill. Relatively little has examined the service role, wherein directors provide advice and guidance to management. This study builds on recent work exploring director expertise by asking how operational expertise on boards impacts firm performance. We find that having external COO/presidents on a board of directors positively impacts firm performance when the firm's operational efficiency is declining, but negatively impacts performance when the firm's operational efficiency is improving. We also find that other types of external executives serving as directors exhibit the opposite relationship, suggesting that the value of director expertise is context-dependent. We discuss the implications of these findings for director selection. Copyright (c) 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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