Independent boards and the institutional investors that prefer them: Drivers of institutional investor heterogeneity in governance preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schnatterly, Karen; Johnson, Scott G.
• 署名单位: University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; Oklahoma State University System; Oklahoma State University - Stillwater
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.2166
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1552-1563
• 关键词: institutional investors; Agency theory; INSTITUTIONAL THEORY; institutional investor heterogeneity; socialization of agency theory

摘要

Institutional investors report that they prefer to invest in firms with greater board independence despite the fact that researchers have been unable to demonstrate a link between board independence and firm performance. We investigate whether differences among institutional investors affect these preferences. We find that trading strategies have some effect but that mutual fundsfacing the strongest institutional pressureshave significantly stronger preferences for firms with greater board independence than do other types of institutional investors. This suggests that institutional investor preferences for independent boards are at least partially driven by institutional pressures rather than anticipated reductions in agency costs. Copyright (c) 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.