Family firms and internationalization-governance relationships: Evidence of secondary agency issues

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Singla, Chitra; Veliyath, Rajaram; George, Rejie
• 署名单位: Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad; University System of Georgia; Kennesaw State University; University System of Georgia; Kennesaw State University; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Bangalore
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.2111
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 606-616
• 关键词: secondary agency problems; INDIA; GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS; family business firms; BLOCKHOLDERS; INTERNATIONALIZATION

摘要

This article documents that blockholders with both ownership and management control in family firms have different goals compared to blockholders with only ownership (but no management) control. We theorize and find evidence that family controlled and family managed (FCFM) firms negatively moderate the relationships between internationalization and governance mechanisms, while family controlled and nonfamily managed (FCNFM) firms do not. The findings indicate that family owners in FCFM firms have greater opportunities to reap private benefits of control indicating the presence of secondary (principal-principal) agency problems, while these problems are mitigated in FCNFM firms. In emerging economies like India where family firms are ubiquitous, they highlight the need to recognize differing blockholder influences on internationalization-governance relationships and to develop more nuanced theorizing for understanding them. Copyright (c) 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.