The impact of culture on the relationship between governance and opportunism in outsourcing relationships

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Handley, Sean M.; Angst, Corey M.
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.2300
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1412-1434
• 关键词: Outsourcing; opportunism; contractual governance; RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE; culture

摘要

To address concerns of opportunism, outsourcing firms are encouraged to deploy contractual and relational governance. The individual and collective effects of these mechanisms have been previously examined but not in specific contexts. This study examines the effects of contractual and relational governance on provider opportunism, incorporating the moderating influence of a shift parameternational culture. Our results reveal that contractual governance is more effective in individualistic and low uncertainty avoidance cultures. Relational governance is more effective in collectivist and high uncertainty avoidance societies. The individualism-collectivism dimension also moderates the joint effect of these mechanisms. While the mechanisms are generally complementary in mitigating opportunism, a singular focus on either contractual or relational can be just as effective under situations of high individualism and collectivism, respectively. Copyright (c) 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.