Unpaid crowd complementors: The platform network effect mirage

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boudreau, Kevin J.; Jeppesen, Lars B.
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.2324
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1761-1777
• 关键词: platforms; INNOVATION; network effects; CROWDS; heterogeneous motivations; digital innovation

摘要

Platforms have evolved beyond just being organized as multi-sided markets with complementors selling to users. Complementors are often unpaid, working outside of a price system and driven by heterogeneous sources of motivationwhich should affect how they respond to platform growth. Does reliance on network effects and strategies to attract large numbers of complementors remain advisable in such contexts? We test hypotheses related to these issues using data from 85 online multi-player game platforms with unpaid complementors. We find that complementor development responds to platform growth even without sales incentives, but that attracting complementors has a net zero effect on on-going development and fails to stimulate network effects. We discuss conditions under which a strategy of using unpaid crowd complementors remains advantageous. Copyright (c) 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.