Board social capital and excess CEO returns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sauerwald, Steve; Lin, Zhiang (John); Peng, Mike W.
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.2339
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 498-520
• 关键词: board social capital; excess CEO returns; Board of directors; financial alignment; normative pressures

摘要

Excess CEO returns refer to CEO financial returns in excess of shareholder returns. How do boards rein in excess CEO returns? Introducing a social capital view of board monitoring, we suggest that boards face two competing normative pressurescorporate elite norms and monitoring norms. How boards conform to such normative pressures for controlling excess CEO returns is affected by their external and internal social capital. Further, we substantiate our arguments by showing that powerful CEOs and institutional investors may facilitate or constrain the normative pressures existing in the social network and alter the effects of board social capital on excess CEO returns. Data from a sample of U.S. corporations listed on the Standard and Poor's 1,500 index from 1999 to 2010 largely support our framework. Copyright (c) 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.