A CLASH OF GOVERNANCE LOGICS: FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND BOARD MONITORING
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Desender, Kurt A.; Aguilera, Ruth V.; Lopezpuertas-Lamy, Monica; Crespi, Rafel
署名单位:
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Northeastern University; Universitat Ramon Llull; Escuela Superior de Administracion y Direccion de Empresas (ESADE); Universitat de les Illes Balears
刊物名称:
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN:
0143-2095
DOI:
10.1002/smj.2344
发表日期:
2016
页码:
349-369
关键词:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP
board monitoring
Board of directors
audit fees
摘要:
We ask whether and when shareholder-oriented foreign owners are likely to change corporate governance logics in a stakeholder-oriented setting by introducing shareholder-oriented governance practices. We focus on board monitoring and claim that because the bundle of practices used in a stakeholder context does not protect shareholder-oriented foreign owners' interests, they seek to introduce their own practices. Our results suggest that board monitoring is only activated when shareholder-oriented foreign ownership is high and that the influence of foreign ownership is especially strong in firms without large domestic owners, with high levels of risk and poor performance. Our findings uncover the possibility of the co-existence of different corporate governance logics within a given country, shaped by the nature and weight of foreign owners Copyright (C) 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.