On the core of m-attribute games

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Ozen, Ulas; Slikker, Marco; Sosic, Greys
署名单位:
Eindhoven University of Technology; University of Southern California
刊物名称:
PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
ISSN/ISSBN:
1059-1478
DOI:
10.1111/poms.13643
发表日期:
2022
页码:
1770-1787
关键词:
convex games Cooperative game theory the core Totally balanced games
摘要:
We study a special class of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU), called m-attribute games. Every player in an m-attribute game is endowed with a vector of m attributes that can be combined in an additive fashion; that is, if players form a coalition, the attribute vector of this coalition is obtained by adding the attributes of its members. Another fundamental feature of m-attribute games is that their characteristic function is defined by a continuous attribute function pi-the value of a coalition depends only on evaluation of pi on the attribute vector possessed by the coalition, and not on the identity of coalition members. This class of games encompasses many well-known examples, such as queueing games and economic lot-sizing games. We believe that by studying attribute function pi and its properties, instead of specific examples of games, we are able to develop a common platform for studying different situations and obtain more general results with wider applicability. In this paper, we first show the relationship between nonemptiness of the core and identification of attribute prices that can be used to calculate core allocations. We then derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which every m-attribute game embedded in attribute function pi has a nonempty core, and a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that pi should satisfy for the embedded game to be convex. We also develop several sufficient conditions for nonemptiness of the core of m-attribute games, which are easier to check, and show how to find a core allocation when these conditions hold. Finally, we establish natural connections between TU games and m-attribute games.