WHEN MORE IS NOT BETTER: COMPLEMENTARITIES, COSTS AND CONTINGENCIES IN STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garcia-Castro, Roberto; Francoeur, Claude
• 署名单位: University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.2341
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 406-424
• 关键词: stakeholders; INSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY; set-theoretic methods; fuzzy sets; firm performance

摘要

Instrumental stakeholder theory has largely emphasized the positive effects of investing in stakeholder cooperative relationships in an additive, linear fashion in the sense that the more investments the better. Yet investing in stakeholders can be very costly and the effects of these investments in firm performance are subject to complex internal complementarities and external contingencies. In this article we rely on set-theoretic methods and a large international dataset of 1,060 multinational companies to explore theoretically and empirically some of the complementarities, costs and contingencies likely to arise in stakeholder management. Copyright (C) 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.