Design of Covid-19 testing queues

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yang, Luyi; Cui, Shiliang; Wang, Zhongbin
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Georgetown University; Tianjin University
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/poms.13673
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2204-2221
• 关键词: covid-19; testing; queues; service discipline; priority

摘要

In the event of a virus outbreak such as Covid-19, testing is key. However, long waiting lines at testing facilities often discourage individuals from getting tested. This paper utilizes queueing-game-theoretic models to study how testing facilities should set scheduling and pricing policies to incentivize individuals to test, with the goal to identify the most cases of infection. Our findings are as follows. First, under the first-in-first-out discipline (FIFO), the common practice of making testing free attracts the most testees but may not catch the most cases. Charging a testing fee may surprisingly increase case detection. Second, even though people who show symptoms are more likely to carry the virus, prioritizing these individuals over asymptomatic ones (another common practice) may let more cases go undetected than FIFO testing does. Third, we characterize the optimal scheduling and pricing policy. To maximize case detection, testing can be made free but one should also (partially) prioritize individuals with symptoms when testing demand is high and switch to (partially) prioritize the asymptomatic when testing demand is moderately low.