Standing out from the crowd: Dedicated institutional investors and strategy uniqueness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oehmichen, Jana; Firk, Sebastian; Wolff, Michael; Maybuechen, Franz
• 署名单位: University of Groningen; University of Groningen; University of Gottingen
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.3269
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1083-1108
• 关键词: Adverse selection; Agency theory; corporate governance; dedicated institutional investors; strategy uniqueness

摘要

Research summary This article examines the effect of dedicated institutional investors on firms' strategy uniqueness. We build on the uniqueness paradox where unique strategies are important drivers of economic rent, yet create an information problem whereby CEOs face discounts from the capital market, thus discouraging them from selecting unique strategies. We propose dedicated institutional investors as a partial remedy to the uniqueness paradox. Dedicated institutional investors invest in gaining private information about their investments, devote effort to understanding firms' strategies, and reduce capital market pressure. Thus, dedicated institutional investors can encourage CEOs to pursue more unique strategies. Our empirical results show the positive influence of dedicated institutional investors on strategic uniqueness, which is even stronger when firms operate in industries that are hard to value. Managerial summary Unique strategies can be an important way for managers to create long-term value. However, some managers shy away from implementing such strategies, fearing that the short-term oriented capital market does not fully understand the long-term benefits of unique strategies and hence punishes them. Our study shows that investors who are long-term-oriented, focused, and committed help resolve this issue. These owners gather in-depth private information about their investments, devote effort to understanding firms' strategies, and reduce capital market pressures. Hence, their commitment and patience can encourage CEOs to pursue more unique strategies. Our study reflects the high levels of responsibility that investors have on strategic decision-making. Therefore, we recommend to intensify the communication between investors and firms on strategic topics (e.g., in form of stewardship policies).