Competitive Industry's Response to Environmental Taxation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krass, Dmitry; Ovchinnikov, Anton
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Queens University - Canada; INSEAD Business School
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1177/10591478251331345
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 3214-3229
• 关键词: environment; pollution; regulation; tax; COMPETITION; TECHNOLOGY; Heterogeneity; MARKET; Demand Function

摘要

We analyze how N firms producing a commodity good with a polluting by-product respond to environmental taxes. These firms vary in operational and environmental efficiency. Under Cournot competition, we examine two demand functions: iso-elastic and linear. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and examine how it changes with tax levels and environmental efficiency. Our findings suggest that taxes may not always benefit firms with green, low-cost technologies, as they erode the advantages of operational efficiency. Additionally, total and per-unit emissions may increase with higher taxes or improved environmental efficiency. Finally, the observed effects can qualitatively differ based on the form of market demand.