Gender and competitiveness when earning for others: Experimental evidence and implications for sponsorship

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barrymore, Nathan; Dezso, Cristian L.; King, Benjamin C.
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.3353
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 905-934
• 关键词: experimental methods; gender and competitiveness; hierarchy; Homophily; other-regarding preferences

摘要

Research Summary Career paths depend not only on individuals' own competitiveness but also on the competitiveness of others in a position to advocate for them. In this article, we study competitiveness when rewards accrue to another individual. In particular, we ask how female and male managers' competitiveness changes when rewards from competition accrue to their female or male proteges, relative to when they accrue to themselves. Using an experimental approach, we find that when rewards accrue to proteges, male and female managers are equally competitive because female managers increase their competitiveness. However, male managers compete more for male rather than female proteges. This gap disappears when male managers know their proteges' risk preferences, suggesting a novel intervention to ensure equity in the sponsorship process. Managerial Summary Sponsorship is key to individuals' career development and firms' human capital strategy. In this experimental study simulating an organizational setting, we investigate one aspect of sponsorship and ask whether managers' and proteges' genders affect managers' willingness to compete on behalf of their proteges. We find that when the rewards from competition accrue to proteges, female managers increase their competitiveness and eliminate the gender competitiveness gap present when rewards accrue to managers themselves. This suggests that, from a competitiveness standpoint, female and male managers are equally strong sponsors. However, male managers compete more for male, relative to female, proteges. This gap disappears when male managers have information about proteges' risks preferences, suggesting a novel approach that organizations can implement to reduce discrimination in sponsorship.