Manufacturer Encroachment in the Presence of Production Economies of Scale

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Li, Wei; Chen, Jing; Pun, Hubert
• 署名单位: Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Dalhousie University; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1177/10591478251378836
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Manufacturer Encroachment; economies of scale; game theory

摘要

It is well established that a manufacturer generally benefits from encroachment with a profitable direct channel and may also benefit from using encroachment as a threat (i.e., without sales in the direct channel); the retailer may also benefit from both encroachment strategies. Our study provides new insights into the manufacturer encroachment literature by considering the upstream manufacturer's production economies of scale. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that an increasing level of economies of scale may reduce the manufacturer's profit if the manufacturer encroaches. Furthermore, we find that under strong economies of scale, refraining from encroachment may be the optimal strategy, even if encroachment could increase the manufacturer's wholesale profit. This finding suggests that a manufacturer may choose not to encroach solely due to profit losses in direct selling. Interestingly, we also find that the manufacturer can benefit from encroachment by maintaining an unprofitable direct channel with sales, provided that the level of economies of scale is below a threshold. Moreover, our findings reveal that the retailer can benefit from manufacturer encroachment only when the level of economies of scale remains below this threshold, and that an increasing level of economies of scale reduces the likelihood that the retailer can benefit.