Managing exploration in organizations: The effect of superior monitoring on subordinate search behavior

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Richter, Valentina; Janjic, Robert; Klapper, Helge; Keck, Steffen; Reitzig, Markus
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/smj.3491
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2226-2254
• 关键词: Laboratory experiments; managerial appraisal; monitoring; NK model; search

摘要

Research Summary: In this article, we explore the effects of managerial monitoring on the behavior of subordinates tasked with the search for alternatives in a complex environment. We argue that managerial monitoring will lead subordinates to exhibit more search than they would engage in otherwise as they try to impress their superiors by exerting more effort. We test and confirm our hypothesis in four laboratory studies with a total of 444 participants. Our findings show that search distance and duration are highly susceptible to managerial monitoring, whereas similar interventions from peers and subordinates are ineffective.Managerial Summary: A key task for employees is to find new solutions to corporate problems when and where they occur. But what determines how long these individuals search and how far they venture before settling on one solution eventually? And how can and should managers steer this process, particularly if they are as unknowing about potential solutions as their subordinates? Here, we show that leaders can bring their staff to explore complex solution spaces longer and more remotely by regularly appraising their subordinates' efforts. This is because employees will feel an enhanced need to demonstrate their industriousness to their bosses, and long and distant search is easily justified. Whether this increases corporate performance depends on the complexity of the solution space and the opportunity costs of search.