TOP MANAGERIAL PRESTIGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL BANKRUPTCY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: D'Aveni, Richard A.
• 署名单位: Dartmouth College; Dartmouth College
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1.2.121
• 发表日期: 1990
• 页码: 121-142
• 关键词: bankruptcy; decline; TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS; EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION; INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES

摘要

This paper extends earlier work on an alternative new of bankruptcy suggesting that bankruptcy occurs when creditors withdraw then support from a firm's top management team It further proposes that support for the top team depends upon the team's prestige Five characteristics measuring the relative status of top teams were tested for their association with bankruptcy Three of the characteristics focused on items commonly associated with membership in economic elites elite educational backgrounds, board memberships, and previous employment as officers in other corporations The fourth and fifth characteristics focused on membership in political and military elites The results indicated that political and board connections were negatively associated with bankruptcy in the seat of failure, even when financial factors and cooptive board linkages were controlled The results also showed that failing firms attempted to improve their managerial prestige three to four years before they failed They were, however, unable to hold onto their guns because of the bailout by prestgious managers in an last two years before bankruptcy