MANAGERIAL RISK TAKING IN DIVERSIFIED FIRMS: AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoskisson, Robert E.; Hitt, Michael A.; Hill, Charles W. L.
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2.3.296
• 发表日期: 1991
• 页码: 296-314
• 关键词: Diversification; managerial risk taking; STRATEGIC CONTROL

摘要

The degree of risk taking by lower level (division) managers is expected to vary depending upon the extent and type of diversification. Limited diversification, when coupled with M-form adoption and decentralization, induces managerial risk taking. Notwithstanding, the control system elaborations (e.g., strategic business unit [SBU] structures) to facilitate information processing as firms increase diversification, extensively diversified firms reach limits such that control loss reduces managerial risk taking. Ultimately, this control loss may result in poor relative performance thereby triggering a threat of takeover. The threat of takeover creates incentives for restructuring and more focused diversification. Firms that reduce their diversified scope through restructuring may induce managerial risk taking. Thus, diversified firms experience periods that induce and other periods that reduce division manager risk taking depending on diversification and associated control system attributes.