When competitive advantage doesn't lead to performance: The resource-based view and stakeholder bargaining power

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coff, RW
• 署名单位: Emory University
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.10.2.119
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 119-133
• 关键词: rent appropriation; resource-based view; Bargaining power; knowledge-based assets

摘要

What if rent from a competitive advantage is appropriated so it. cannot be observed in performance measures? The resource-based view was not formulated to examine who will get the rent. Yet, this essay argues that the factors leading to a resource-based advantage also predict who will appropriate rent. Knowledge-based assets are promising because firm-specificity, social complexity, and causal ambiguity make them hard to imitate. However, the roles of internal stakeholders may grant them a great deal of bargaining power especially relative to investors. This essay integrates the resource-based view with the bargaining power literature by defining the firm as a nexus of contracts. This new lens can help to explain when rent will be generated and, simultaneously, who will appropriate it. In doing so, it provides a more robust theory of firm performance than the resource-based view alone. It is also suggested that this lens might be useful for examining other theories of firm performance.