Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Schulze, WS; Lubatkin, MH; Dino, RN; Buchholtz, AK
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; University of Connecticut; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.12.2.99.10114
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 99-116
• 关键词: Agency theory; altruism; privately-owned firms; family business

摘要

The authors have conducted the kind of research here that we all reach for but too often fail to grasp. I That is, this study of the governance of family firms is theoretically rich and practically relevant. Our colleagues have pressed the limits of agency theory to explore the control of owners' opportunistic behavior, behavior that interestingly just might be rooted in an altruistic impulse. They have done this by empirically examining privately-held, family-managed firms. While such firms embody the dominant form of organization in the world today, they are very underrepresented in our study of organization and management. This research simultaneously advances our understanding of agency theory and draws much needed attention to these kinds of firms. Spend some time with this paper. I think you will be glad that you did.