Organizational incentives and organizational mortality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shane, S
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.12.2.136.10108
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 136-160
• 关键词: franchising; Contract design; firm survival; evolutionary economics

摘要

Despite a long tradition of research on organizational mortality, organizational theorists have not examined the effect of incentive contracting on firm survival. This paper fills this gap by examining the effect of incentive contracting on the survival of U.S. business format franchise systems over the period 1984-1996. The paper finds empirical support for several hypotheses derived from efficient contracting theory. In general, large firms that adopt policies which screen agents, signal quality, and control agents' free-riding are more likely to survive than large firms which do not adopt these policies.