Incentives and computing systems for team-based organizations: A mathematical and economic analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Merlone, U
• 署名单位: University of Turin
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.13.6.734.500
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 734-736
• 关键词: teams; production and organization; moral hazard

摘要

This paper provides a mathematical and economic analysis of Incentives and Computing Systems for Team-Based Organizations by A. Barua, C. H. Sophie Lee, and A. B. Whinston, which was published in Organization Science in 1995. Several points were not adequately stated in the original article and one of the key definitions is not clear, nor is it in keeping with the classical theory of production. Although the Cobb-Douglas production function is often used in the article, it does not comply with the article's definitions. The two main contributions of this paper are (1) to provide a word of caution to other readers who might try to extend Barua et al. (1995) and (2) to suggest alternative formulations and directions for future research.