Repeated Interactions and Contractual Detail: Identifying the Learning Effect

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Vanneste, Bart S.; Puranam, Phanish
署名单位:
University of London; London Business School
刊物名称:
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
ISSN/ISSBN:
1047-7039
DOI:
10.1287/orsc.1080.0402
发表日期:
2010
页码:
186-201
关键词:
contractual detail learning Repeated interactions INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
摘要:
Organizations interacting repeatedly on similar transactions may learn from prior experiences, allowing contracts to be specified in greater detail. In this study, we analyze the conditions under which this learning effect is most likely to manifest itself. We do this by focusing on different parts of a contract as well as differences across transacting parties. Using a survey of information technology procurement contracts from 788 Dutch small- and medium-sized enterprises, we show that the learning effect is stronger for technical than for legal detail in contracts and is stronger for firms with information technology expertise than for firms without such expertise.
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