Category Signaling and Reputation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Negro, Giacomo; Hannan, Michael T.; Fassiotto, Magali
• 署名单位: Emory University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2014.0935
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 584-600
• 关键词: sociology of markets; ORGANIZATION THEORY; signaling; reputation; CATEGORIES; WINE INDUSTRY; Alsace

摘要

We propose that category membership can operate as a collective market signal for quality when low-quality producers face higher costs of gaining membership. The strength of membership as a collective signal increases with the sharpness of the category boundary, that is, contrast. Our empirical study focuses on biodynamic and organic viticulture in Alsace.