The Structure of Political Institutions and Effectiveness of Corporate Political Lobbying

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Choi, Seong-Jin; Jia, Nan; Lu, Jiangyong
• 署名单位: Hanyang University; University of Southern California; Peking University
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2014.0936
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 158-179
• 关键词: corporate political activities (CPA); Political systems; entry point; veto point; cross-country study

摘要

This paper investigates how the structure of political institutions influences the effectiveness of corporate political lobbying by shaping the veto points and entry points that lobbying firms encounter and require, respectively, when attempting to influence public policies; in so doing, this study deepens our understanding of the strategic implications of institutional environments. Using large-sample and cross-country firm-level data, we find that the influence of firms' lobbying activities on public policies is weakened when there are tighter constraints generated as a result of greater political (partisan) competition and more subnational government tiers. We find that the negative association between the effectiveness of lobbying and political (partisan) competition is particularly pronounced in countries with lower electoral accountability and that the negative association between the effectiveness of lobbying and subnational government tiers is particularly pronounced in more centralized political systems.