Inter-partner credible threat in international joint ventures: An infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma model
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Zhang, Y; Rajagopalan, N
署名单位：
Rice University; University of Southern California
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2506
DOI：
10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8491026
发表日期：
2002
页码：
457-478
关键词：
摘要：
We use an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma model to examine the role of inter-partner credible threat in international joint ventures (IJVs). Inter-partner credible threat refers to the certainty of either partner's retaliation given the other partner's earlier cheating. We argue that inter-partner credible threat represents the first order determinant and partners' management control represents the second order determinant of partner payoffs. When inter-partner credible threat is present, both partners achieve balanced payoffs whereas when it is absent, partners' relative payoffs. In-depth interview data from four IJVs in China provide preliminary support for our theoretical arguments.
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