Relational ties or customized contracts? An examination of alternative governance choices in China

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhou, Kevin Zheng; Poppo, Laura; Yang, Zhilin
• 署名单位: University of Hong Kong; University of Kansas; City University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400363
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 526-534
• 关键词: governance transitions; relational ties; legal contracts; emerging economies; CHINA

摘要

As business transactions become more complex in China - an increasingly market-driven economy - are managers more likely to employ relational ties or contracts? Consistent with the view that personal institutions govern transactions in China, our analysis of 361 buyer-supplier exchanges indicates that managers rely more on relational ties as asset specificity and uncertainty increase. We also find some support that impersonal institutions govern market transactions: as uncertainty increases, managers craft more customized contracts. Surprisingly, there is no association between contracts and asset specificity. These results hold for both local and foreign firms.