Executive Turnover: The Influence of Dispersion and Other Pay System Characteristics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Messersmith, Jake G.; Guthrie, James P.; Ji, Yong-Yeon; Lee, Jeong-Yeon
• 署名单位: George Washington University; University of Kansas; University System of Maryland; Towson University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-9010
• DOI: 10.1037/a0021654
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 457-469
• 关键词: pay dispersion; tournament theory; top management team turnover

摘要

Using tournament theory as a guiding theoretical framework, in this study, we assess the organizational implications of pay dispersion and other pay system characteristics on the likelihood of turnover among individual executives in organizational teams. Specifically, we estimate the effect of these pay system characteristics on executive turnover decisions. We use a multi-industry, multilevel data set composed of executives in publicly held firms to assess the effects of pay dispersion at the individual level. Consistent with previous findings, we find that pay dispersion is associated with an increased likelihood of executive turnover. In addition, we find that other pay characteristics also affect turnover, both directly and through a moderating effect on pay dispersion. Turnover is more likely when executives receive lower portions of overall top management team compensation and when they have more pay at risk. These conditions also moderate the relationship between pay dispersion and individual turnover decisions, as does receiving lower compensation relative to the market.