Self-disclosure at international cartels

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brenner, Steffen
• 署名单位: Copenhagen Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/jibs.2010.37
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 221-234
• 关键词: legal astuteness; cross-border competition; cartels; nested data structure

摘要

We study revelation behavior at illegal international cartels. Our hypotheses suggest that a resource advantage induces executives of large multinational enterprises (MNEs) to be more likely to reveal the cartel and to cooperate with the antitrust agency during the prosecution stage. Moreover, we expect the cultural background to influence the firm's inclination to reveal incriminating evidence. Empirical tests based on data about cartel breakdowns under the EU Leniency Program show that large MNEs are indeed more likely to reveal the cartel. However, they largely fail to explain variation in legal actions along cultural dimensions. Journal of International Business Studies (2011) 42, 221-234. doi:10.1057/jibs.2010.37