Unintended signals: Why companies with a history of offshoring have to pay wage penalties for new hires

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grecu, Alina; Sofka, Wolfgang; Larsen, Marcus M.; Pedersen, Torben
• 署名单位: Copenhagen Business School; University of Liverpool; BI Norwegian Business School; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/s41267-021-00486-3
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 534-549
• 关键词: Offshoring; hiring; WAGE PENALTY; hidden costs; SIGNALING THEORY

摘要

We explore how companies with a history of offshoring attract their future employees. We reason that offshoring decisions send unintended signals about job insecurity to companies' onshore labor markets. This signaling effect implies that offshoring companies must pay higher salaries for new hires than non-offshoring companies. We tested our predictions on a sample of 7971 matched managers and professionals recently hired by offshoring and non-offshoring companies. Our results indicate a 3-7% wage penalty for offshoring companies. Thus, we conclude that not only is offshoring challenging to implement, but it can also entail a number of general ramifications for the domestic labor market.