Family firms and the governance of global value chains
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Debellis, Francesco; Rondi, Emanuela; Buckley, Peter J.; De Massis, Alfredo
署名单位:
University of Vienna; University of Bergamo; University of Manchester; Alliance Manchester Business School; Free University of Bozen-Bolzano; International Institute for Management Development (IMD); Lancaster University; Zhejiang University; Zhejiang University
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN:
0047-2506
DOI:
10.1057/s41267-024-00716-4
发表日期:
2024
页码:
962-975
关键词:
INTERNALIZATION THEORY
Global value chains
Global factory
Family firms
SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH
Mixed gamble
摘要:
The current evolution of global value chains (GVCs) calls for moving beyond the unipolar view of lead multinational enterprises (MNEs) as sole rulers to examine how their characteristics and those of partner firms affect GVC governance. In response to this call, we focus on family firms, which are the most ubiquitous organizational form worldwide and represent the majority of firms participating in GVCs. Unlike non-family firms, these organizations face distinct mixed gambles, driven by both economic and non-economic goals. However, internalization theory and the associated global factory model, which explain GVC governance, rely solely on economic assessments, limiting our understanding and predictability of MNE behavior. Therefore, in this study, we show how location decisions, degree of internalization, and relationship management in GVCs differ from the conventional global factory model when family firms are involved as lead MNEs and/or partners. By analyzing how comparative efficiency considerations change when family firms are involved, we offer implications for internalization theory and provide a more comprehensive framework for understanding control and trust dynamics in GVCs. Thus, we pave the way for future research to revise and enrich international business theories, taking into account the distinctiveness and heterogeneity of family firms.
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