The effects of government debt on corporate borrowing in developing economies: evidence from Africa

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Colak, Gonul; Habimana, Theogene; Korkeamaki, Timo
• 署名单位: Hanken School of Economics; University of Sussex; Aalto University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/s41267-025-00791-1
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 874-900
• 关键词: Government debt; Corporate leverage; Financial crowding-in; Sovereign ceiling; Eurobonds

摘要

Many African economies face high debt levels, yet local firms have unique growth opportunities requiring external financing. We examine whether government borrowing constrains corporate financing in Africa and how these effects differ by debt source. Using a manually collected dataset from 29 African countries (2000-2019), we uncover financing patterns that challenge conventional theories. In sharp contrast to firms in developed markets, we find that African firms experience a crowding-in effect when governments borrow externally, enhancing their access to debt. In contrast, domestic government borrowing induces the typical crowding-out effect, where government borrowing reduces corporate access to debt. The crowding-in phenomenon is most evident among publicly listed firms, particularly those cross-listed on foreign exchanges (the multinationals). The effect strengthens in countries with higher Eurobond market activity and intensifies following sovereign credit downgrades, underscoring the sovereign ceiling's constraint on corporate borrowing. Our findings contribute significantly to international business literature by revealing how African debt markets function differently, highlighting unique financing challenges faced by African multinational enterprises, and demonstrating that economic principles established in developed markets cannot be universally applied to emerging economies. These insights are crucial for designing effective policies to support corporate growth in Africa. De nombreuses & eacute;conomies africaines sont confront & eacute;es & agrave; des niveaux d'endettement & eacute;lev & eacute;s, alors que les entreprises locales disposent d'opportunit & eacute;s de croissance uniques n & eacute;cessitant un financement externe. Nous examinons si les emprunts d'Etats limitent le financement des entreprises en Afrique et comment ces effets diff & egrave;rent selon la source de la dette. & Agrave; l'aide d'un ensemble de donn & eacute;es manuellement collect & eacute;es dans 29 pays africains (2000-2019), nous mettons en lumi & egrave;re des configurations de financement qui remettent en question les th & eacute;ories conventionnelles. Contrairement aux entreprises des march & eacute;s d & eacute;velopp & eacute;s, nous constatons que les entreprises africaines b & eacute;n & eacute;ficient d'un effet de renforcement (crowding-in effect) lorsque les gouvernements empruntent & agrave; l'ext & eacute;rieur, ce qui am & eacute;liore leur acc & egrave;s & agrave; la dette. En revanche, les emprunts d'Etats & agrave; l'& eacute;chelle domestique induisent l'effet d'& eacute;viction typique (crowding-out effect), o & ugrave; les emprunts publics r & eacute;duisent l'acc & egrave;s des entreprises & agrave; l'endettement. Le ph & eacute;nom & egrave;ne de renforcement est particuli & egrave;rement & eacute;vident parmi les entreprises cot & eacute;es en bourse, en particulier celles qui sont cot & eacute;es sur des bourses & eacute;trang & egrave;res (les multinationales). L'effet se renforce dans les pays o & ugrave; l'activit & eacute; du march & eacute; des euro-obligations est plus forte, et s'intensifie & agrave; la suite des d & eacute;gradations de la cote de cr & eacute;dit de l'& Eacute;tat, ce qui met en & eacute;vidence la contrainte du plafond souverain sur les emprunts des entreprises. Nos r & eacute;sultats contribuent significativement & agrave; la litt & eacute;rature des affaires internationales en r & eacute;v & eacute;lant le fonctionnement diff & eacute;rent des march & eacute;s africains de la dette, en mettent en & eacute;vidence les d & eacute;fis de financement uniques auxquels sont confront & eacute;es les multinationales africaines, et en d & eacute;montrant que les principes & eacute;conomiques & eacute;tablis sur les march & eacute;s d & eacute;velopp & eacute;s ne peuvent & ecirc;tre universellement appliqu & eacute;s aux & eacute;conomies & eacute;mergentes. Ces & eacute;clairages sont essentiels & agrave; l'& eacute;laboration des politiques efficaces pour soutenir la croissance des entreprises en Afrique. Muchas econom & iacute;as africanas enfrentar altos niveles de endeudamiento, sin embargo, las empresas locales tienen oportunidades & uacute;nicas de crecimiento que requieren financiamiento externo. Examinamos si el endeudamiento gubernamental restringe el financiamiento corporativo en & Aacute;frica y c & oacute;mo estos efectos difieren seg & uacute;n la fuente de la deuda. Utilizando una base de datos recopilada manualmente de 29 pa & iacute;ses africanos (2000-2019), descubrimos patrones de financiamiento que desaf & iacute;an las teor & iacute;as convencionales. En marcado contraste con las empresas en mercados desarrollados, encontramos que las empresas africanas experimentan un efecto de atracci & oacute;n (crowding-in en ingl & eacute;s) cuando los gobiernos se endeudan externamente, mejorando su acceso a la deuda. En cambio, el endeudamiento gubernamental dom & eacute;stico induce el t & iacute;pico efecto de crowding-out (desplazamiento), donde el endeudamiento gubernamental reduce el acceso corporativo a la deuda. El fen & oacute;meno de crowding-in es m & aacute;s evidente entre las empresas que cotizan en bolsa, particularmente aquellas con cotizaci & oacute;n cruzada en bolsas extranjeras (las multinacionales). El efecto se fortalece en pa & iacute;ses con mayor actividad en el mercado de Eurobonos y se intensifica despu & eacute;s de las rebajas en la calificaci & oacute;n crediticia soberana, subrayando la restricci & oacute;n que el techo soberano impone sobre el endeudamiento corporativo. Nuestros hallazgos contribuyen significativamente a la literatura de negocios internacionales al revelar c & oacute;mo los mercados de deuda africanos funcionan de manera diferente, destacando desaf & iacute;os & uacute;nicos de financiamiento que enfrentan las empresas multinacionales africanas, y demostrando que los principios econ & oacute;micos establecidos en mercados desarrollados no pueden aplicarse universalmente a econom & iacute;as emergentes. Estas perspectivas son cruciales para dise & ntilde;ar pol & iacute;ticas efectivas que apoyen el crecimiento corporativo en & Aacute;frica. Muitas economias africanas enfrentam altos n & iacute;veis de endividamento, mas empresas locais t & ecirc;m oportunidades de crescimento & uacute;nicas que exigem financiamento externo. Analisamos se o endividamento governamental restringe o financiamento corporativo na & Aacute;frica e como esses efeitos variam de acordo com a fonte do endividamento. Utilizando um conjunto de dados coletado manualmente de 29 pa & iacute;ses africanos (2000-2019), descobrimos padr & otilde;es de financiamento que desafiam teorias convencionais. Contrariando empresas de mercados desenvolvidos, constatamos que empresas africanas experimentam um efeito de crowding-in quando os governos tomam empr & eacute;stimos externos, o que aumenta seu acesso ao cr & eacute;dito. Por outro lado, o endividamento governamental interno gera o t & iacute;pico efeito de crowding-out, em que o cr & eacute;dito governamental reduz o acesso de empresas ao endividamento. O fen & ocirc;meno crowding-in & eacute; mais evidente entre empresas de capital aberto, especialmente aquelas com a & ccedil;& otilde;es listadas em bolsas estrangeiras (as multinacionais). O efeito & eacute; mais forte em pa & iacute;ses com maior atividade no mercado de Eurobonds e & eacute; aumentado ap & oacute;s rebaixamentos de cr & eacute;dito soberano, evidenciando a restri & ccedil;& atilde;o imposta pelo teto soberano ao endividamento empresarial. Nossas descobertas contribuem significativamente para a literatura em neg & oacute;cios internacionais ao revelar como mercados de d & iacute;vida africanos funcionam de forma distinta, destacando desafios de financiamento & uacute;nicos enfrentados pelas empresas multinacionais africanas e demonstrando que princ & iacute;pios econ & ocirc;micos estabelecidos em mercados desenvolvidos n & atilde;o podem ser aplicados universalmente em economias emergentes. Essas conclus & otilde;es s & atilde;o cruciais para a formula & ccedil;& atilde;o de pol & iacute;ticas eficazes de apoio ao crescimento empresarial na & Aacute;frica. 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