Global investors, hidden suppliers: how institutions shape the impact of stock market liberalization programs on corporate responsibility

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Yan, Shipeng; Jiang, Wei; Xu, Yue
• 署名单位: University of Hong Kong; Renmin University of China; South China Normal University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/s41267-025-00804-z
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: ESG investing; INSTITUTIONAL THEORY; CHINA; Corporate responsibility; Supplier identity disclosure

摘要

Research suggests that firms participating in stock market liberalization programs are exposed to global investors who can exert cross-border influence on management decisions. Accordingly, as global investors increasingly adopt environmental, social, and governance (ESG) principles, firms in these programs may enhance their corporate responsibility and their commitment to addressing grand challenges. We challenge this literature by explaining why this effect of stock market liberalization programs should not be taken for granted, especially in emerging markets and contribute to the field by showing that institutional factors moderate this relationship. Using China's stock market liberalization programs as natural experiments that quasi-exogenously connect emerging-market firms to global investors, we find that emerging-market firms in stock liberalization programs reduce their disclosure of supplier identity information, an important step in tackling environmental grand challenges. However, when emerging-market firms have certain characteristics, such as a large proportion of committed foreign ownership, global environmental certifications, and top leadership with overseas experience, the negative effect is diminished and even reversed as the balance between the long-term upsides and short-term downsides of voluntary supplier disclosure shifts. Les recherches sugg & egrave;rent que les entreprises participant & agrave; des programmes de lib & eacute;ralisation des march & eacute;s boursiers sont expos & eacute;es & agrave; des investisseurs mondiaux capables d'exercer une influence transfrontali & egrave;re sur les d & eacute;cisions de gestion. En cons & eacute;quence, & agrave; mesure que les investisseurs mondiaux adoptent de plus en plus les principes environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance (ESG), les entreprises participant & agrave; ces programmes peuvent renforcer leur responsabilit & eacute; soci & eacute;tale et leur engagement & agrave; relever les grands d & eacute;fis. Nous remettons en question cette litt & eacute;rature en expliquant pourquoi cet impact des programmes de lib & eacute;ralisation des march & eacute;s boursiers ne devrait pas & ecirc;tre consid & eacute;r & eacute; comme acquis, en particulier dans les march & eacute;s & eacute;mergents, et contribuons au domaine en montrant que des facteurs institutionnels mod & egrave;rent cette relation. En utilisant les programmes de lib & eacute;ralisation des march & eacute;s boursiers en Chine comme exp & eacute;riences naturelles qui connectent de mani & egrave;re quasi-exog & egrave;ne les entreprises des march & eacute;s & eacute;mergents aux investisseurs mondiaux, nous constatons que les entreprises des march & eacute;s & eacute;mergents participant & agrave; ces programmes r & eacute;duisent leur divulgation d'informations sur l'identit & eacute; de leurs fournisseurs, une & eacute;tape importante pour relever les grands d & eacute;fis environnementaux. Cependant, lorsque les entreprises des march & eacute;s & eacute;mergents poss & egrave;dent certaines caract & eacute;ristiques, telles qu'une forte proportion de propri & eacute;t & eacute; & eacute;trang & egrave;re engag & eacute;e, des certifications environnementales mondiales et une direction g & eacute;n & eacute;rale ayant une exp & eacute;rience & agrave; l'& eacute;tranger, l'impact n & eacute;gatif est att & eacute;nu & eacute;, voire invers & eacute;, & agrave; mesure que l'& eacute;quilibre entre les avantages & agrave; long terme et les inconv & eacute;nients & agrave; court terme de la divulgation volontaire des fournisseurs & eacute;volue. La investigaci & oacute;n sugiere que las empresas que participan en programas de liberalizaci & oacute;n del mercado de valores est & aacute;n expuestas a inversionistas globales que pueden ejercer influencia transfronteriza en las decisiones gerenciales. En consecuencia, a medida que los inversionistas globales adoptan cada vez m & aacute;s los principios ambientales, sociales y de gobernanza (ESG por sus iniciales en ingl & eacute;s), las empresas en estos programas podr & iacute;an mejorar su responsabilidad corporativa y su compromiso para abordar los grandes desaf & iacute;os. Desafiamos esta literatura al explicar por qu & eacute; este efecto de los programas de liberalizaci & oacute;n del mercado de valores no debe darse por sentado, especialmente en los mercados emergentes, y contribuimos al campo demostrando que los factores institucionales moderan esta relaci & oacute;n. Utilizando los programas de liberalizaci & oacute;n del mercado de valores de China como experimentos naturales que conectan de manera cuasi-ex & oacute;gena a las empresas de mercados emergentes con inversionistas globales, encontramos que las empresas de mercados emergentes en programas de liberalizaci & oacute;n burs & aacute;til reducen su divulgaci & oacute;n de informaci & oacute;n sobre la identidad de sus proveedores, un paso importante para abordar los grandes desaf & iacute;os ambientales. Sin embargo, cuando las empresas de mercados emergentes tienen ciertas caracter & iacute;sticas, como una gran proporci & oacute;n de propiedad extranjera comprometida, certificaciones ambientales globales y liderazgo de alta direcci & oacute;n con experiencia internacional, el efecto negativo disminuye e incluso se revierte a medida que el equilibrio entre las ventajas a largo plazo y las desventajas a corto plazo de la divulgaci & oacute;n voluntaria de proveedores cambia. Pesquisas sugerem que empresas participantes de programas de liberaliza & ccedil;& atilde;o do mercado acion & aacute;rio ficam expostas a investidores globais, que podem exercer influ & ecirc;ncia transfronteiri & ccedil;a sobre decis & otilde;es gerenciais. Consequentemente, & agrave; medida que investidores globais adotam cada vez mais princ & iacute;pios ambientais, sociais e de governan & ccedil;a (ESG), empresas inseridas nesses programas podem intensificar sua responsabilidade corporativa e seu compromisso em enfrentar grandes desafios. Desafiamos essa literatura ao explicar por que esse efeito de programas de liberaliza & ccedil;& atilde;o do mercado acion & aacute;rio n & atilde;o deve ser um pressuposto, especialmente em mercados emergentes, e contribu & iacute;mos para essa & aacute;rea ao mostrar que fatores institucionais moderam essa rela & ccedil;& atilde;o. Usando programas chineses de liberaliza & ccedil;& atilde;o do mercado acion & aacute;rio como experimentos naturais que conectam quase exogenamente empresas de mercados emergentes a investidores globais, constatamos que empresas de mercados emergentes inseridas em programas de liberaliza & ccedil;& atilde;o acion & aacute;ria reduzem sua divulga & ccedil;& atilde;o de informa & ccedil;& otilde;es sobre a identidade de fornecedores, uma etapa importante para lidar com grandes desafios ambientais. Contudo, quando empresas de mercados emergentes possuem certas caracter & iacute;sticas, como elevada propor & ccedil;& atilde;o comprometida de propriedade estrangeira, certifica & ccedil;& otilde;es ambientais globais e alta lideran & ccedil;a com experi & ecirc;ncia internacional, o efeito negativo & eacute; reduzido e at & eacute; mesmo revertido, quando o equil & iacute;brio entre benef & iacute;cios de longo prazo e desvantagens de curto prazo da divulga & ccedil;& atilde;o volunt & aacute;ria de fornecedores se altera. 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