The convention on tax mutual administrative assistance and divestment: Evidence from China

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Song, Xiaoning; Yan, Jiayan; Cai, Guilong; Chen, Huimin (Amy)
• 署名单位: Sun Yat Sen University; Nanjing University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Lowell
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/s41267-024-00747-x
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 336-349
• 关键词: The Convention; divestment; Tax enforcement; tax havens

摘要

Various policy instruments have been employed to combat international tax avoidance by multinational corporations (MNCs), with a focus on corporate tax disclosure. However, corporate tax disclosure to tax authorities alone is insufficient to address the issue. The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (the Convention) goes beyond tax disclosure by featuring direct international tax administrative assistance and aiming to strengthen governments' tax enforcement. Intrigued by the uniqueness of the Convention, we examine its effect on Chinese MNCs' tax avoidance, particularly their investments in tax-haven jurisdictions. We conjecture that Chinese MNCs, anticipating strengthened tax enforcement after the Convention, may reduce tax-avoidance behavior and divest from tax havens. Using the staggered entry of China and other countries into the Convention, we find that after the Convention, Chinese MNCs tend to divest from tax havens, with a stronger effect observed in MNCs whose parent firms are in regions with weak tax enforcement. Additionally, we observe a decline in overall tax aggressiveness following the Convention. Our findings highlight the Convention's disciplining effect, extend the tax avoidance literature on international collaboration, and help the OECD and other international regulators better understand its impact on countries with limited administrative capacity. In recent years, governments worldwide have collaborated to address tax avoidance by multinational corporations (MNCs). These efforts have resulted in policies aimed at increasing transparency and cooperation between countries. However, some studies suggest that merely disclosing tax information to authorities isn't sufficient to prevent tax avoidance, especially in countries with limited resources to enforce tax laws. This study focuses on the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (a policy providing support for tax enforcement, including information exchange and assistance in tax collection). The research specifically examines the impact of this Convention on Chinese MNCs and their investments in tax havens (countries with low or no taxes that attract companies looking to reduce their tax bills).This study investigates whether the Convention has led Chinese MNCs to reduce their tax avoidance behaviors, particularly in tax havens. Researchers used data from Chinese MNCs with foreign subsidiaries, focusing on the years when both China and the subsidiary's country signed the Convention. They found that after signing the Convention, Chinese MNCs decreased their number of foreign subsidiaries, especially in tax havens. The study also discovered that MNCs located in regions of China with weaker tax enforcement showed a more significant reduction in tax haven investments. This suggests that the Convention's support for tax enforcement has a stronger impact in areas where local tax authorities previously struggled to enforce tax laws effectively.The results of this research indicate that the Convention has a disciplining effect on MNCs, leading to a decrease in tax avoidance activities. For policymakers and international regulators, these findings highlight the potential of the Convention to improve tax enforcement in countries with limited administrative capacity. The study suggests that international cooperation can be an effective tool against tax avoidance, particularly when it includes practical support for enforcing tax laws. Looking forward, this research could influence how countries approach the issue of tax avoidance and encourage more widespread adoption of the Convention to strengthen tax enforcement globally.This text was initially drafted using artificial intelligence, then reviewed by the author(s) to ensure accuracy. Divers instruments politiques ont & eacute;t & eacute; utilis & eacute;s pour lutter contre l'& eacute;vasion fiscale internationale des soci & eacute;t & eacute;s multinationales (Multinational Corporations - MNCs), et ce en mettant l'accent sur la divulgation de l'imp & ocirc;t sur les soci & eacute;t & eacute;s. Toutefois, cette divulgation aux autorit & eacute;s fiscales ne suffit pas & agrave; elle seule & agrave; r & eacute;soudre le probl & egrave;me. La Convention concernant l'Assistance Administrative Mutuelle en Mati & egrave;re Fiscale (Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters) va au-del & agrave; de la divulgation d'informations fiscales en proposant une assistance administrative fiscale internationale directe et en visant & agrave; renforcer l'application de la l & eacute;gislation fiscale par les gouvernements. Intrigu & eacute;s par le caract & egrave;re unique de la Convention, nous examinons ses effets sur l'& eacute;vasion fiscale des MNCs chinoises, en particulier sur leurs investissements dans les paradis fiscaux. Nous supposons que les MNCs chinoises, anticipant un renforcement de l'application de la l & eacute;gislation fiscale apr & egrave;s l'entr & eacute;e en vigueur de la Convention, pourraient r & eacute;duire leur comportement d'& eacute;vasion fiscale et se d & eacute;sinvestir des paradis fiscaux. En utilisant l'entr & eacute;e & eacute;chelonn & eacute;e de la Chine et d'autres pays dans la Convention, nous constatons qu'apr & egrave;s la Convention, les MNCs chinoises ont tendance & agrave; se d & eacute;sinvestir des paradis fiscaux, avec un effet plus important observ & eacute; dans les MNCs dont les soci & eacute;t & eacute;s m & egrave;res se trouvent dans des r & eacute;gions & agrave; faible application de la l & eacute;gislation fiscale. En outre, nous observons une baisse de l'agressivit & eacute; fiscale globale apr & egrave;s la Convention. Nos r & eacute;sultats mettent en lumi & egrave;re l'effet disciplinant de la Convention, & eacute;largissent la litt & eacute;rature sur l'& eacute;vasion fiscale dans le cadre de la collaboration internationale, et aident aussi l'OCDE et d'autres r & eacute;gulateurs internationaux & agrave; mieux comprendre son impact sur les pays avec une capacit & eacute; administrative limit & eacute;e. Varios instrumentos pol & iacute;ticos se han usado para combatir la evasi & oacute;n de impuestos internacionales por parte de las corporaciones multinacionales (MNCs por sus iniciales en ingl & eacute;s, con un enfoque en declaraci & oacute;n del impuesto de sociedades. Sin embargo, la sola declaraci & oacute;n del impuesto de sociedades a las autoridades fiscales no basta para resolver el problema. El Convenio sobre Asistencia Administrativa Mutua en Materia Fiscal (el Convenio) va m & aacute;s all & aacute; de la divulgaci & oacute;n de informaci & oacute;n fiscal, ya que ofrece asistencia administrativa fiscal internacional directa y busca reforzar la aplicaci & oacute;n de la legislaci & oacute;n fiscal por parte de los gobiernos. Intrigados por la singularidad del Convenio, examinamos su efecto sobre la evasi & oacute;n fiscal de las multinacionales chinas, en particular sus inversiones en jurisdicciones con para & iacute;sos fiscales. Suponemos que las multinacionales chinas, previendo una aplicaci & oacute;n m & aacute;s estricta de la legislaci & oacute;n fiscal tras la Convenci & oacute;n, podr & iacute;an reducir su evasi & oacute;n fiscal y desinvertir en para & iacute;sos fiscales. Usando la entrada gradual de China y otros pa & iacute;ses en la Convenci & oacute;n, encontramos que despu & eacute;s de la Convenci & oacute;n, las multinacionales chinas tienden a desinvertir en para & iacute;sos fiscales, observ & aacute;ndose un efecto m & aacute;s fuerte en las multinacionales cuyas casas matrices se encuentran en regiones con una d & eacute;bil aplicaci & oacute;n de la legislaci & oacute;n fiscal. Adem & aacute;s, observamos un descenso de la agresividad fiscal general tras la Convenci & oacute;n. Nuestros resultados resaltan el efecto sancionatorio del Convenio, ampl & iacute;an la literatura sobre la evasi & oacute;n fiscal en la colaboraci & oacute;n internacional y ayudan a la OCDE y a otros reguladores internacionales a entender mejor su impacto en los pa & iacute;ses con una capacidad administrativa limitada. V & aacute;rios instrumentos de pol & iacute;tica foram empregados para combater a elis & atilde;o fiscal internacional por corpora & ccedil;& otilde;es multinacionais (MNCs), com foco na divulga & ccedil;& atilde;o fiscal corporativa. No entanto, a divulga & ccedil;& atilde;o fiscal corporativa apenas para autoridades fiscais & eacute; insuficiente para abordar a quest & atilde;o. A Conven & ccedil;& atilde;o sobre M & uacute;tua Assist & ecirc;ncia Administrativa em Mat & eacute;rias Fiscais (a Conven & ccedil;& atilde;o) vai al & eacute;m da divulga & ccedil;& atilde;o fiscal, apresentando assist & ecirc;ncia administrativa tribut & aacute;ria internacional direta e visando fortalecer a execu & ccedil;& atilde;o fiscal dos governos. Intrigados pela singularidade da Conven & ccedil;& atilde;o, examinamos seu efeito sobre a elis & atilde;o fiscal de MNCs chinesas, particularmente seus investimentos em jurisdi & ccedil;& otilde;es de para & iacute;sos fiscais. Conjecturamos que MNCs chinesas, antecipando um incremento da execu & ccedil;& atilde;o fiscal ap & oacute;s a Conven & ccedil;& atilde;o, podem reduzir o comportamento de elis & atilde;o fiscal e desinvestir de para & iacute;sos fiscais. Utilizando a entrada escalonada da China e de outros pa & iacute;ses na Conven & ccedil;& atilde;o, descobrimos que, ap & oacute;s a Conven & ccedil;& atilde;o, MNCs chinesas tendem a desinvestir de para & iacute;sos fiscais, com um efeito mais forte observado em MNCs cujas empresas controladoras est & atilde;o em regi & otilde;es com d & eacute;bil execu & ccedil;& atilde;o fiscal. Al & eacute;m disso, observamos uma diminui & ccedil;& atilde;o na agressividade fiscal geral ap & oacute;s a Conven & ccedil;& atilde;o. Nossas descobertas destacam o efeito disciplinador da Conven & ccedil;& atilde;o, ampliam a literatura sobre elis & atilde;o fiscal sobre colabora & ccedil;& atilde;o internacional e ajudam a OCDE e outros reguladores internacionais a entender melhor seu impacto em pa & iacute;ses com capacidade administrativa limitada. 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