Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Machiavellianism and Executive Pay

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Recendes, Tessa; Hill, Aaron D.; Aime, Federico; Ridge, Jason W.; Petrenko, Oleg V.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Oklahoma State University System; Oklahoma State University - Stillwater; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-9010
• DOI: 10.1037/apl0001290
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER; TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS; pay; severance pay; Machiavellianism

摘要

Integrating theory and evidence about Machiavellianism (Mach) into executive pay-setting research, we theorize about how chief executive officers (CEOs) higher in Mach may be both more motivated to initiate negotiations and more effective in utilizing social influence tactics in the pay-setting process, thus positively relating to their own pay outcomes. Specifically, we first theorize that CEO Mach positively associates with a CEO's total pay and severance pay. Moreover, because paying top management team (TMT) members more is also in CEOs' interests-such as to help build TMT loyalty and cooperation, aid hiring, and ease retention while also narrowing the CEO-TMT pay differential to thus provide an impetus for a CEO pay raise-we argue that CEO Mach positively relates to TMT pay as well. Using a longitudinal sample of S&P 500 firms and clinical psychologists trained to assess CEO Mach from publicly available data, we find evidence supporting our theorizing.