Is CEO pay in high-technology firms related to innovation?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balkin, DB; Markman, GD; Gomez-Mejia, LR
• 署名单位: University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/1556340
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 1118-1129
• 关键词: research-and-development; executive-compensation; managerial incentives; AGENCY-THEORY; performance; OWNERSHIP; matter; BOARD; strategy; Duality

摘要

This study uses the resource-based view of the firm and agency theory to examine the relationship between innovation and CEO pay in 90 high-technology firms. With firm size, performance, and other factors controlled, CEO short-term compensation was related to innovation as measured by number of patents and R&D spending. The data also suggest a less consistent temporal relationship between innovation and long term CEO compensation in the high-technology firms. In a control sample of 74 low-technology firms, there was no relationship between innovation and either short- or long-term CEO pay.