Power dynamics within top management and their impacts on CEO dismissal followed by inside succession

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shen, W; Cannella, AA Jr
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/3069434
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 1195-1206
• 关键词: EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION; performance; turnover; BOARD; governance; DIRECTORS; CHOICE; MODEL

摘要

Following a power perspective, this study is a longitudinal examination of the antecedents of CEO dismissal followed by inside succession. Our theory highlights interest conflicts and competition within top management. We propose that CEO origin, CEO tenure, non-CEO inside directors, and senior executive ownership are important antecedents of CEO dismissal followed by inside succession. Evidence from a sample of 387 large U.S. corporations suggests that non-CEO senior executives frequently play an important role in CEO dismissal.