Microlevel opportunity structures as determinants of non-CEO executive pay

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carpenter, MA; Wade, JB
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/3069426
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 1085-1103
• 关键词: TOP-MANAGEMENT; DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES; ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT; COMPENSATION STRATEGY; firm performance; team; experience; IMPACT; POWER; environment

摘要

We develop a theory wherein the pay of non-CEO executives can be explained by micro-level opportunity structures-the intersection of functional position, CEO background, human capital, and firm strategic resource allocation decisions. Our theory suggests a positive association between pay and a position made visible by resource allocation decisions, a functional background similar to that of the CEO, and a position that helps the firm manage strategic resource allocations. A unique longitudinal data set that combines survey and archival data on the four highest echelons of senior executives in large U.S. firms provided support for this multilevel framework.