The role of power and politics in the repricing of executive options

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pollock, TG; Fischer, HM; Wade, JB
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/3069432
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 1172-1182
• 关键词: firm; governance; OWNERSHIP; COMPENSATION; management; BEHAVIOR; CEOS

摘要

We explore how CEO power affects the repricing of executive options. The spread between an option's exercise, or strike, price, and the market value of a stock impacts the likelihood of repricing. This effect is enhanced when the CEO of the firm in question is also the chairman of its board. Firm and CEO visibility, more board members appointed after a CEO's hiring than before it, a staggered board, and relatively high percentages of CEO and institutional ownership reduce the impact of the spread on the likelihood of repricing.