Acquisition returns, increase in firm size, and chief executive officer compensation: The moderating role of monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wright, P; Kroll, M; Elenkov, D
• 署名单位: University of Memphis; University of Louisiana System; Louisiana Technical University; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/3069384
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 599-608
• 关键词: institutional investors; MANAGERIAL DISCRETION; Ownership structure; AGENCY COSTS; performance; diversification; determinant; incentives; governance; strategy

摘要

Our theoretical argument is that the effect of acquisition-related factors on CEO compensation is contingent upon the intensity of monitoring activities. In firms with vigilant monitors, returns will explain changes in CEO compensation. In firms with passive monitors, increased corporate size due to an acquisition will explain compensation changes. We found support for our hypotheses in a sample of 171 acquisitions over the 1993-98 time period.