The use of relational discrimination to manage market entry: When do social status and structural holes work against you?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jensen, Michael
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 723-743
• 关键词: Investment banking; COMMERCIAL-BANKS; networks; performance; COMPETITION; DYNAMICS; Heterogeneity; reputation; RESOURCES; predation

摘要

This study examines how incumbent firms use relational discrimination to manage threats from market entry. The use of relationships to manage market entry implies that incumbent firms decide to collaborate with entering firms instead of incumbent firms on the basis of the extent to which entering firms threaten their own market positions. I argue that incumbent firms seeking collaborators switch between favoring and disfavoring entering firms compared to incumbent firms depending on their social status and brokerage opportunities. Comprehensive data on commercial banks' entry into investment banking in the period 1991 to 1997 provide empirical support for my arguments.