PUTTIN' ON THE RITZ: PRE-IPO ENLISTMENT OF PRESTIGIOUS AFFILIATES AS DEADLINE-INDUCED REMEDIATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Guoli; Hambrick, Donald C.; Pollock, Timothy G.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 954-975
• 关键词: initial public offerings; TOP MANAGERIAL PRESTIGE; long-run performance; MARKET; POWER; time; uncertainty; reputation; networks; venture

摘要

We describe two theoretical explanations for the amount, pace, and costs of the prestige enhancement a firm engages in during the year before its initial public offering. The snowball model captures well-known processes whereby prestige-rich organizations accumulate even more prestige. The dressing-up model builds upon deadline-induced remediation, a phenomenon not previously studied in a macro-organizational context. In 242 software IPOs, the snowball model substantially explains final-year prestigious hiring. But there is also strong evidence of a tandem dressing-up process. As the final year counts down, prestige-poor firms aggressively hire prestigious executives and directors and pay higher prices to do so.