How do MNCs vote in developing country elections?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vaaler, Paul M.
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 21-43
• 关键词: POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES; MULTINATIONAL-CORPORATIONS; JAPANESE FIRMS; Bond spreads; institutions; partisanship; COMPETITION; strategies; ratings; POLICY

摘要

Research on multinational corporations (MNCs) and host government political risk in developing countries has largely ignored local electoral politics, economic policies, and the MNC investment incentives they may generate. In response, I develop and test a framework for understanding MNC risk and investment behavior based on political business cycle considerations. Analyses of 408 MNC investments worth $199 billion in 18 developing countries holding 35 presidential elections from 1987 through 2000 are consistent with these considerations: MNCs perceive higher (lower) risk and announce fewer (more) investment projects as right-wing (left-wing) incumbents appear more likely to be replaced by left-wing (right-wing) challengers.